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研究揭露 RPMC 弱點,Windows Hello 四位數 PIN 可在 40 小時內破解

Exploiting Replay Protected Monotonic Counters to Brute-Force Windows Hello PINs

重點導讀

Windows Hello 使用短 PIN 時,靠 TPM 的防暴力猜測機制阻止攻擊者反覆嘗試;這篇研究發現,部分硬體儲存鎖定紀錄的方式有漏洞。

  • 研究者用低成本硬體裝置,讓系統回復到較舊的鎖定狀態,並在一臺已鎖定、加密的裝置上,於 40 小時內找出四位數 Windows Hello PIN。
  • 原本最壞情況需要 69 天。研究也指出,同樣的方法可用來攻擊 BitLocker 的 TPM+PIN 開機保護,將預設長度六位數 PIN 的最壞猜測時間從 19 年縮短到 20 天。研究摘要未提供修補方式。

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研究以低成本硬體測試 RPMC 在量產 x86 系統中的防護弱點,並展示狀態回復如何大幅縮短 PIN 暴力猜測所需時間。

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Abstract:Windows Hello is the primary authentication mechanism on over one billion Windows 11 devices, supporting PINs as short as four digits. Such low-entropy PINs are viable only because the TPM's anti-hammering protection mitigates brute-force attacks. Most modern x86 platforms rely on firmware TPMs (fTPMs) that persist their non-volatile (NV) state, including the lockout state, to SPI flash. On newer platforms, rollback prevention of this state is delegated to the flash chip via Replay Protected Monotonic Counters (RPMCs), a JEDEC-standardized mechanism operating over a physically accessible bus.
We present the first practical security analysis of RPMC in shipping x86 systems. Using low-cost interposer hardware, we identify multiple implementation flaws, two of which fundamentally undermine RPMC's security model: First, Winbond SPI flash - the leading NOR flash vendor with over 25% market share - leaks its HMAC key under voltage glitching, enabling arbitrary counter forgery. Second, AMD's NV controller does not verify RPMC increments, so an interposer can suppress them unnoticed. Moreover, AMD platforms without RPMC flash appear to lack NV rollback protection altogether: on two AMD desktops, reflashing an old image resets the fTPM's lockout counters.
Both flaws enable rollbacks of the fTPM's NV state (AMD, Intel, or Pluton), including its lockout counters. We demonstrate this end-to-end on locked, encrypted hardware: our setup finds a 4-digit Windows Hello PIN in 40 hours instead of 69 days. A compromised PIN also grants access to device-bound keys and Hello-based enterprise SSO. The same primitive defeats BitLocker's TPM+PIN pre-boot protector, reducing the worst-case time for a default-length 6-digit PIN from 19 years to 20 days.
Comments: This is a slightly updated version of the paper published at ACM CCS '26 (this https URL). The section Changes from the CCS '26 Version lists all changes
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)
Cite as: arXiv:2611.18126 [cs.CR]
  (or arXiv:2611.18126v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
  https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2611.18126

arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

Related DOI: https://doi.org/10.1145/3830454.3846631

DOI(s) linking to related resources

Submission history

From: Christian Werling [view email]
[v1] Fri, 13 Nov 2026 12:53:55 UTC (1,565 KB)

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